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1. Introduction.  In a previous paper entitled “Cognitive Scientific Realism” (Rohrlich 2001, in the following referred to as CSR), a form of realism was proposed that seems to be free of various difficulties encountered by other formulations of realism.  The present study consists of two parts.  In the first part, a new and strong argument for cognitive scientific realism is introduced.  It is the coherence of superseded and superseding theories (Section 2).  This theory coherence implies the coherence of the cognitive levels and is therefore of great epistemological importance.  
As a general attitude in the present work, I want to emphasize that I am trying to be at all times fully aware of actual scientific practice both with respect to its positive as well as its negative characteristics.  This will make it unnecessary to check at a later time whether the present philosophical view “meets the constraints of coherence with well-established science”.
The starting point of cognitive scientific realism is the level structure of science.  Improved instrumentation led historically from the common level of human experience to the availability of smaller and smaller as well as larger and larger scales for scientific exploration.  Although these scales form a continuum, scientific research led naturally to a bunching of theories on different levels.  These levels are cognitively distinct since they are found to involve incommensurable ontologies.  This fact poses the problem (not addressed in CSR) that the whole structure may not be coherent and possibly not even internally consistent.  Section 2 is devoted to this problem and its successful resolution.	
I shall now summarize very briefly the main points made in CSR.  Under consideration are only mature theories.  By ‘theory’ I mean a complex structure that has various components including central terms, an ontology, a semantics, and a mathematical component.  The latter is the case at least in the physical sciences.  I shall therefore limit myself to these.
‘Maturity’ of a theory means that its validity domain (see CSR Section 2) with respect to at least one of the superseding theories is known.  A superseding theory lies on a deeper level than the theory it supersedes.  “Deeper” here means farther removed from the common level of everyday experience.  This may be either towards smaller (‘atomic’) scales or towards larger (‘cosmic’) scales.  The unfortunate labels ‘superseded’ and ‘superseding’ commonly used are relics of the school of logical empiricism.  As we shall see, they are no longer appropriate.  I shall nevertheless use them since in most cases the theories in question have not yet reached the stage of established theory in the sense of Rohrlich and Hardin (1983).  
In order to define ‘established theory’, the notion of validity domain, D, introduced in CSR must be recalled.  It is defined by a dimensionless parameter p that is the ratio of two characteristic quantities, one from the superseded theory S and one from the superseding theory T.  This parameter p gives the error made when S rather than T is applied; therefore, p << 1.  In this way, p defines the validity domain D.  A theory is called ‘established’ when its domain of validity is known completely; this means that the parameter p for all theories that immediately supersede it is known. 
A clarifying example is the established theory ‘Newtonian mechanics’ including gravitational forces.  It has three deeper theories superseding it: special relativity (for ‘higher’ speeds), p = v2/c2 << 1; Einstein’s gravitation theory (for ‘larger’ gravitational attraction),  p = rS/r <<1 (see CSR equation (14)), and quantum mechanics (for ‘smaller’ spacetime sizes d),  p = /d << 1,  where   is the Compton wavelength,  =h/mc, (h is Planck’s constant).  What ‘higher’, ‘larger’, and ‘smaller’ mean is now specified by the validity domain D.  This domain is therefore here characterized by three different parameters p, one relative to each of these three superseding theories.
Two comments must here be made: (1) The characterizations ‘superseded’ and ‘established’ are in no way meant to imply that such theories are no longer capable of further scientific growth and mathematical enrichment.  Actual scientific practice provides ample evidence for that.  (2) Without a clear knowledge of the validity domain of a theory, great confusion can arise in philosophy of science: it can lead to anarchy.  An example is the claim “science is much closer to myth than a scientific philosophy is prepared to admit” (Feyerabend 1976, chapter 18).
A corner stone of cognitive scientific realism (CSR) is the failure of theory reduction.  It fails because the reduced theory, S, and the reducing theory, T, have  different ontologies.  These ontologies are (taking a term from the Kuhn-Feyerabend school) incommensurable.  Incommensurability is here meant in the semantic sense.  When one deduces the fundamental equations of S from those of T, the reduction procedure stumbles exactly on the meaning of the symbols of the equations. The derived equations have the mathematical form desired for S, but the symbols contained in them refer to the ontology of the superseding theory, T, from which the equations are derived.  They do not refer to the ontology of S.  The reduction process fails because the ontology of S cannot be reached from T in a deductive way.  My paper contains four case studies in which this situation is demonstrated explicitly (CSR sections 6 to 9).
	The way to proceed in view of this failure of reduction was first indicated by Nagel (1961).  His idea has been developed further into what I call ontological bridges.  These are relations between the ontologies of S and T (as referred to by symbols in their equations). These relations must be satisfied so that the equations deduced from T are indeed those of S, i.e. actually refer to the ontology of S rather than to the ontology of T.  The establishment of an ontological bridge requires the knowledge of both, S and T which makes it impossible for the bridges to be part of a deductive process.   These bridges have the purpose to bridge the cognitive gap between S and T that is left by the mathematical deduction process.  But these bridges can only provide a formal and non-rational link.
The status of these bridges is often misunderstood.  Ontological bridges, while relating the ontology of two different levels semantically, are not like dictionaries that translate a given concept from one language to another.   In dictionaries, there exists one concept that has different names in different languages.  ‘Translation’ is the expression of one such name in terms of one or more others.  In the case of ontological bridges, there exist different concepts (different ontologies) all with their own name that are to be connected by ontological bridges.  These bridges are therefore not translations.  Rather, they are statements of relationships between the languages of two theories on different cognitive levels.  Bridges cannot be found by logical reasoning; nor are they cognitively obvious.  Rather, a bridge is the expression of a necessary cognitive jump over a semantic gap that must be performed in order to relate two known but incommensurable ontologies.  The bridges are not arbitrary but connect two well-defined ontologies; these play the role of bridgeheads.  In fact, ontological bridges are unique because both ontologies are well defined and unique, and so are the equations that refer to them.
Finally, I want to touch on the issue of truth that has not been adequately treated in CSR.  It will enter repeatedly in the considerations below.  A realist view of science must satisfy two different requirements, one with regard to the external world that the theories describe, the other with respect to the internal consistency between theories.  The first requirement, that of the relationship to the external world, requires empirical adequacy.  It can be characterized by semantic truth as expressed by Tarski sentences.  
Semantic truth is the truth of correspondence (in the Tarski formulation) of predictions to empirical data.  It is essential in the justification of our belief that the theory is true on external grounds; it enters in the determination of the empirical adequacy of the theory.  The Tarski statement of truth requires bivalence (Goldman 1988, p.322), and I note that this holds also in the quantum domain when quantum reality is suitably formulated (Rohrlich 1985; see also Rohrlich 1983).
CSR clarifies the issue of comparison between theory and observation: the ill-defined term ‘approximate truth’ need no longer be applied to a theory because it is no longer necessary.  Instead, there is a well-defined limit of the domain of validity for each theory (see CSR, Section 2) that provides knowledge of the anticipated error for each of its predictions before the empirical evidence is available.  The domain of validity may be further restricted by the particular model used when the theory is applied.  ‘Model’ here refers to the particular idealization of the phenomenon or process under consideration (neglect of features considered unimportant).  But such restrictions (which are almost always present) provide further well-defined restrictions to the validity domains.  Improved models have larger validity domains.  Thus, the empirical adequacy of a ‘theory + model’ can in this way be improved.  Not only can the predictions be compared with the observations, but the expected accuracy of the theory’s predictions and the error limits of the empirical data can also be compared.  ‘Empirical adequacy’ is then the claim that predictions and empirical data agree within their respective and independently known errors.
The second requirement, the requirement of internal consistency, will be met by level coherence.  This is much stronger than internal consistency; but it does not by itself provide for truth of realism.  It does, however, provide strong epistemological support for truth (see for example Niiniluoto 1999).  Level coherence and empirical adequacy will each play crucial but quite different roles in what follows.  And as a combination, they will be seen to provide support for the epistemological truth of scientific realism.
	After the discussion of theory coherence (Section 2), various antirealist views are considered and refuted (Sections 3-5). The final Section 6 provides a summary of the main results.

2. The Coherence of Theories.   The failure of reduction is a symptom of the cognitive necessity for retention of the ontology of the ‘superseded’ theory S.  But then, the whole theory must be retained because it is cognitively the best within its domain of validity.  Therefore, each mature theory has a considerable measure of autonomy.  Not only is it retained after being ‘superseded’, but it also cannot be replaced by any other theory because no other theory is as acceptable cognitively.  The autonomy of theories arising in this way leads to a pluralistic way of our understanding of the world.  Each theory is true but does not give the whole truth: it gives the whole truth only for its level.  All theories (on all levels) must be known in order to have the whole truth (simpliciter). This is an important consequence of the incommensurability of ontologies.  (Examples of incommensurable ontologies are given in the four case studies in CSR Sections 6-9.)
On the other hand, there is coherence between theories on different levels as will now be shown.  This is the case despite the autonomy of theories and the failure of theory reduction. The tension between autonomy and coherence will be shown to be only apparent.
	In order to isolate the specific issue, it is desirable to distinguish first between “horizontally” and “vertically” related theories.  By this I simply mean to distinguish pairs of theories that are on the same cognitive level from those that are on different levels and therefore in a superseding/ superseded relationship.  The horizontally related theories are surely not a serious problem.  For example, we know of horizontal coherence between different branches of biological sciences: they conspire to provide mutually confirming evidence for medical diagnoses; similarly, cultural anthropology and geology confirm each others results for the age of a piece of recently unearthed pottery.  They receive further confirmation from nuclear physics (carbon dating) which lies on a deeper level.  Contradictory answers from different sciences is surely not acceptable.  Their absence and the existence, instead, of confirmatory agreements by theories supports horizontal coherence.
But the vertically related theories do seem to pose a serious problem for coherence, especially after what was said above about their autonomy and specifically about the incommensurability of their ontologies. At least, theories on different levels must be consistent with one another.  But actually, we want more than a lack of contradiction: is there clear evidence for coherence of theories in the sciences?  I shall now argue for such evidence.   
A.  I claim that strong support for the coherence of theories lies in the existence of reductive explanations.   Given theory S, one can ask two types of why-questions.  There are questions that can be answered by an explanation within S, and there are questions that cannot be so answered.  In the latter case, theory S is simply incapable of providing an answer to a specific question.  Such a question requires a deeper level theory, a superseding theory, T, for an explanation. Such an explanation is called a reductive explanation (see CSR section 5).   
	Reductive explanations are very common.  Examples of questions requiring reductive explanations in physics are: Why are certain solids magnetic?  Why do certain materials lose their resistance to electric currents at very low temperature (the phenomenon of superconductivity)?  Reductive explanations are needed for such uncommon phenomena as radioactivity and nuclear explosions as well as for very common phenomena: “why does ice float on water rather than sink to the bottom?”  
Consider the last example.  On the level S, we know that ice is just frozen water and therefore must be the same ‘stuff’.  And since it is solidified, one expects it to be ‘more compact’ than the fluid form.  Thus, on level S it is expected to be heavier and should sink rather than float.  Why does it float?  The answer by reductive explanation was given in CSR, Section 5.
In chemistry, practically all of macroscopic chemistry is phenomenological:  explanations are given as reductive explanations to the molecular and atomic levels. In astronomy, questions such as “what provides the energy of the sun?” or “what causes supernovae?” require nuclear physics for their explanations.   
What is important in reductive explanations is the fact that one has to go back and forth between the ontologies of theories on different levels.  The ontological bridges provide a two-way street.  Without them, reductive explanations would not be possible.  Therefore, these bridges are much more than artificial devices that relate theory S to theory T: they make reductive explanations possible and thereby facilitate theory coherence.  The fact, that reductive explanations are successful in all the physical sciences is strong evidence for theory coherence. 
	B.  Consider next the relation between two field theories on adjacent levels.  Strong support for theory coherence can be found in the corrections that theory T can provide for predictions beyond the validity limits of S.  Such corrections need not remain in T but can be successfully incorporated into the ontology of S.	
Nature is continuous in the sense that phenomena can occur on all scales of length, time interval, weight, etc.  But the domain of validity of every theory is limited.   What happens when the predicted accuracy of a theory, S, is no longer adequate for the higher accuracy of improved empirical evidence?  The superseding theory, T, must be consulted.  However, very often the full and generally more complicated theory T may not be necessary: S needs  ‘just a small correction’.   Theory coherence provides such a correction by T in terms of the ontology of S. 
Consider the deductive process that leads from the equations, ET, of the reducing theory T to those of the reduced theory S, ES.  There exists a suitable dimensionless parameter, p, whose smallness, p<<1, characterizes the validity domain of S relative to T.  A suitable expansion in powers of p then leads from ET to ES.  
	From the point of view of mathematics, expansions in powers of p are permissible (converge) for functions whose analyticity domain includes the interval 0  p < 1 of the real line (regular perturbation expansion).  In the theory reduction process, the equations ES​ ​then result from the equations ET to lowest order in this expansion.  But it is also possible to take into account higher powers of p.  Each additional order will add to the accuracy of the prediction.
	This means that there are actually an infinite number of successively more accurate equations corresponding to the infinite number of powers of p in the expansion.  These are all approximations to T with increasing accuracy.  They must all be described by the ontology of T.
	The practicing scientist does not use all these equations.  She usually uses only S and possibly S with one or at most two ‘correction terms’ derived from T.  Only if that is not sufficient, the full theory T is applied.  This is simply a mathematical expediency.  But it is remarkable that S with a correction derived from T can be well described by the ontology of S.
	An example will help here: consider Newtonian (NGT) and Einsteinian (EGT) gravitation theories (case study of Section 9 in CSR).  When applied to the motion of a single planet around the sun, NGT predicts an elliptic orbit with the sun as one of the focal points (Kepler’s first law, 1605).  Only in the 19th century did observations became accurate enough to show deviations from that law that could not be explained by NGT.  EGT, developed in the early 20th century, gave indeed a prediction that accounted for the observations correctly. However, in first approximation, this result of EGT can be expressed in terms of the Kepler ellipse: it can be described as a steady slow advance of the perihelion of the planet.  That description employs Newtonian ontology, not Einsteinian!
	C.  A third type of evidence for theory coherence can be found in symmetries and the related conservation laws.  There exist deep mathematical theorems that relate symmetries to conservation laws; they are called “Noether theorems” (Noether 1918).  A symmetry is expressed by the invariance of a theory’s equations under a group of transformations. The generators of the infinitesimal transformations of this group are conserved throughout the motion of the system that is governed by these equations.  Coherence of theories on different levels is evidenced by the close relationship that exists between the invariance groups that exist for vertically related theories.
	Typically, a superseded theory, S, is invariant under a symmetry group GS. That group is either the same symmetry group, GT, under which the superseding theory, T, is invariant, or GS is a group that can be deduced from GT.  In the latter case, GS is obtained from GT by group contraction or it is a subgroup of GT.  Thus, there exist basic mathematical relationships between GS and GT that indicate coherence.  This coherence is perhaps the deepest relation between vertically related theories (and by implication between levels).   Symmetry is therefore not only a guide to theory (van Fraassen 1989) but is also strong support for the coherence between theories.
 	As an example, the symmetry expressed by the invariance group of spacetime translations, holds for all physical systems not subject to external constraints, no matter on what cognitive level.  This symmetry implies the laws of momentum conservation and of energy conservation for all such physical systems.
	When these three considerations, A, B, and C, are combined, they provide convincing evidence for the claim that “there exists strong coherence between vertically related scientific theories”.  It follows that even though the ontologies of S and T are incommensurable, the two theories are nevertheless coherent in the above sense. 
The first requirement for any scientific theory is of course empirical adequacy.  It relates the theory to the external world and certifies that it accounts for it correctly.  But empirical adequacy does not imply that the theory is necessarily true (van Fraassen 1980): semantic truth does not imply epistemological truth.  But then there is a second requirement, internal consistency, and even a third, consistency between theories.  The second is largely ensured by mathematical consistency which is always present by the time a theory becomes mature.  The third requirement is implied by the coherence between theories as was discussed above.  It is more than consistency between theories because coherence implies that theories actually support one another.  
If this is indeed the case for theories, it is by implication also the case for levels.  Theory coherence implies level coherence.  This property strengthens greatly our belief  that the apparent beak-up of our view of the world into cognitive levels does not damage our ability to attain coherent knowledge of the world as a whole.  That it is indeed ‘of the world’ is ensured by the empirical adequacy of the theories.  The result is epistemological truth about the world.
The claim of truth by coherence alone cannot stand: it is conceivable that a coherent system of scientific beliefs is altogether false despite its coherence.  Neither is empirical adequacy alone sufficient for epistemological truth   But, the combination of both, theory coherence and empirical adequacy, is extremely powerful.  It provides strong epistemological support for cognitive scientific realism.  

3. Against Fundamentalism and the Convergence of Truth.   It is often claimed that according to realism, scientific theories contain “approximate truths”, and that these approximations are then improved to better approximations in superseding theories. The sequence of superseding theories is then claimed to converge, presumably to “exact truths”.  These claims are then supposed to lead to a “convergent” scientific realism which therefore also implies the existence of a “final theory”.  
	I call the belief in such a convergence to a final theory “fundamentalism”.  According to cognitive scientific realism, it is a mistaken view.
The basic idea of cognitive levels implies a cognitive value of each mature theory. For this reason, a mature theory, S, cannot be replaced or improved upon by a theory, T, on any other level.  Other levels are different in that their theories involve ontologies different from that of S (in fact incommensurable with it). They are therefore not comparable and therefore cannot be ‘a better approximation’.  As mentioned before, each theory provides true propositions about nature on its level; these propositions are not necessarily meaningful on any other level exactly because of the semantic incommen-surability of ontologies.
It is incorrect to label a theory as “approximate” because of its finite validity domain.  That domain refers not only to the validity of its claims but also to its cognitive nature (as characterized by its ontology).  To put it simply and bluntly by a trivial example: “grass is green” is a true claim of cognitive value, but it is not the whole truth about grass.  Nor is it only approximately true; it is exactly true.  “Grass consists of plant cells” is also exactly true; but the latter does not improve the previous claim; it only adds to it, and it does so on a different cognitive level.  Two truths are not ‘more true’ than each truth separately.  In a world of two-valued logic, ‘true’ has neither a comparative nor a superlative form.  The fact that both truths together provide more knowledge than each one separately is trivial and is not an improvement on the truth of any one of them.  The label ‘convergent’ for the truth of scientific realism is therefore incorrect.  
Theory reduction does not carry through just because of the difference in ontologies of adjacent levels.  Therefore, the deepest theory, the fundamental theory, does not imply any of the less fundamental ones.  The much heralded fundamental theory, the “theory of everything” or TOE (championed for example by Weinberg 1992) would be very interesting to see - if it exists, but it would not make any of the other theories unnecessary.   Each (mature) theory is cognitively needed.
Another objection to a final theory is that its very existence is in serious doubt.  (Dresden 1998).  For example, the search for a final theory may become as meaningless as the search for the boundary of the universe.
	If fundamentalism were taken on its face value, the knowledge of TOE would make all the theories on higher (shallower) cognitive levels unnecessary because they would all be implied by it.  That this cannot be the case follows logically from the incommensurability of theories on different levels.  And it follows cognitively from the necessity of holistic notions present and necessary on every level.
One concludes that fundamentalism is deeply flawed.

4. Against Underdetermination.   It is not uncommon for a new empirical fact to have more than one “explanation”.  Such explanations involve various hypotheses that cannot possibly be true simultaneously.  Usually, further empirical evidence decides in favor of one of these although it may take a long time before such evidence becomes available. Before that happens, realists are at least uncomfortable while antirealists are pleased with that state of affairs.  A well-known historical example is the theory of light: Huygens’ wave theory and Newton’s corpuscular theory were both empirically adequate.  Newton’s authority caused his theory to become generally accepted while the theory by Huygens was largely ignored, to the delight of today’s social constructivists.  This situation lasted for about a century.  Then, around 1800, Thomas Young provided a crucial experiment (exhibiting interference patterns) that decided the matter on empirical grounds in favor of Huygens and against Newton.    
If alternative hypotheses continue to persist even in the face of additional evidence, the issue of choice between empirically equivalent ‘theories’ arises.  Although such questions of theory choice have become increasingly rare as modern science entered into a phase of higher technology yielding measurements of larger variety as well as of higher precision in the 19th and 20th century, this issue continued to haunt philosophers.  I used quotation marks on ‘theories’ because in almost all cases, mature theories were not involved.  This is especially so for the physical sciences.
This issue of empirical equivalence becomes greatly exacerbated when it is claimed that no other criterion exists: in that case, empirical equivalence necessarily implies underdetermination of the theory.  That view dates back to Duhem (1906, Part II, Chapter VI) and was later taken up by Quine. More recently, Laudan and Leplin gave an extensive treatment of underdetermination (Laudan 1996, chapter 3; see also chapter 2).  They suggest that the implication of underdetermination from empirical equivalence is based on the incorrect assumption that epistemologic relations are reducible to semantic relations.
In the present paper, I offer a somewhat related criticism of underdetermination.  I claim that empirical adequacy is not the only criterion for theory choice.  The property of theory coherence is equally important as a criterion.  The former tests the theory toward the external world; the latter tests it relative to other theories.  I concur with van Fraassen in the claim that empirical adequacy does not assure the truth of a theory (van Fraassen 1980).  The truth of the adequacy of a theory is semantic truth as expressed by Tarski sentences.  But more support is needed for the belief of the truth of a theory.  I claim that the additional fact of theory coherence provides such strong epistemological support for the belief in the truth of a theory.  (Note that I do not invoke a ‘coherence theory of truth’.  See Niiniluoto 1999 on this point.)  
Among mature physical theories empirical equivalence is rare indeed.  There is only one example known to me: conventional quantum mechanics (QM) and the Bohm version of quantum mechanics (BM) (Cushing 1994).  QM and BM are both non-relativistic theories.  They are equally well empirically adequate because their predictions are mathematically identical.  But they claim completely different ontologies.  Thus, without any further criterion for theory choice, this is a typical case of underdetermi-nation.
The relativistic generalization of quantum mechanics is quantum field theory (QFT); it is empirically adequate for the most accurate measurements in science today such as those in quantum electrodynamics.  QM and QFT are coherent theories.  But BM and QFT are not coherent.  QM was developed in the 1920s and QFT a few years later.  But while BM was developed half a century ago, so far no relativistic QFT formulation has so far been found that is coherent with BM (see for example Bub 1997, pp.242-245).  This fact provides strong epistemological evidence against BM and in favor of QM.  Thus, we see that the problem of theory choice can be resolved on the basis of theory coherence.
Quite apart from this argument, there has recently been raised doubt concerning the internal coherence (internal consistency) of BM (Baublitz and Shimony in Cushing 1996).  One thus concludes that there is no support for underdetermination in the choice between QM and BM.  And since this is the only case in the physical sciences known to involve underdetermination, this problem does not exist at present.

5. Against Instrumentalism.   Instrumentalism comprises a wide class of views.  Unfortunately, there does not seem to exist a very clear definition of instrumentalism.  The claim “scientific theory is nothing but a calculating device, an instrument for obtaining predictions” is somewhat vague. Its main goal seems to be an argument against realism.  What exactly is that instrument for?  Is it only for calculating the outcome of experiments?  Can it be used to the description of phenomena?   Can it provide a resource for inquiry?  
	In a paper of a dozen years ago, Howard Stein takes advantage of this vagueness.  He claims that there is not really a great difference between realism and instrumentalism if the latter is sufficiently extended.  When instrumentalism is suitably understood, one might claim that “what the realist can do, the instrumentalist can do also” (Stein 1989, p.52).   
	Granting this extended form of instrumentalism, it still does not accomplish more than, say, constructive empiricism (van Fraassen 1980).  Both, the instrumentalist and the constructive empiricist are able to provide for empirically adequate theories.  But neither of them, I claim, can account for theory coherence.  If theories are only tools and resources rather than actual representations of reality, what reason is there for such a surprising fact that theories on different levels cohere?  Why should tools and resources from different levels to cohere?  The instrumentalist is forced to regard the fact of theory coherence as an unexpected miracle?  One is led to Putnam’s well-known argument (1975) that the miraculous success of science cannot be explained but by scientific realism.  It is a natural consequence of the combined epistemological evidence provided by empirical adequacy together with theory coherence.  This combination leads to the view of cognitive scientific realism advocated here.

6. The Main Points of Cognitive Scientific Realism.  We can now look at the completed structure of Cognitive Scientific Realism and emphasize its key points.
	(1) What is ‘real’?  An entity, property, or process is real exactly when it is contained in an established theory as part of its ontology. The necessity of an ‘established’ rather than only a ‘mature’ theory is evident from the example of quantum mechanics which is still not established (in the sense of Rohrlich and Hardin 1983; see also Section 1 above).  
At this point, I must mention that many theories can be cast in different mathe-matical forms (representations) from which scientists often draw conclusions about ad hoc elements of ontology, i.e. elements that are meaningful only with respect to that particular representation (for examples see Rohrlich 1999).  Such elements cannot be included in the actual ontology of the theory.
	(2) The retention of superseded theories on grounds of their cognitive importance has three far-reaching implications.  First of all, it makes for a pluralistic ontology of realism (Rohrlich1983).  Secondly, it leads to an important role for holism, and thirdly, it provides for emergence (see Humphreys (1997) and Rohrlich (1997)).
	(3) Scientific theories must satisfy two basic conditions, empirical adequacy and coherence.  The latter refers especially to theory coherence between levels.  When both conditions are satisfied, there is strong epistemic support for truth in scientific realism.   Semantic truth by correspondence expresses empirical adequacy by means of Tarski sentences.  Theory coherence does not make for epistemic truth by coherence (which does not to seem exist, at least not in philosophy of science) but it does provide strong epistemic support for the truth of scientific realism when combined with empirical adequacy.  This combination is also strong enough to refute various antirealist views (Sections 3 to 5). 
	(4) The development of science is in the direction from putative theories to mature theories to established theories.  Combined with theory coherence, there results a net of established theories.  This process clearly exhibits the cumulativity of science. 
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